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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Interest in workplace democracy and producer's cooperatives is on
the rise in America, and has been for the past decade.

Worker ownership

and control is seen as possible not just by theoreticians, but by workers themselves.
before

This is not unique in American history, as it occurred

collective

bargaining became

the

primary

This era of "reform unionism" ended when the
formed failed.

approach of unions.

cooperative firms

they

These attempts at "cooperation," like all such attempts,

demonstrated the susceptibility of cooperatives to trends of degeneration, under-capitalization,
fore, failure.
two things.

lack of institutional support,

Why, then, the rise in interest?

and, there-

It is due, I think, to

The first is need, as the deindustrialization process has

put firms, which may even be profitable, out of business.
workers look for an alternative.

To save jobs

The second reason is the remarkable

success of the system of cooperatives centered in Mondragon in the Basque region of Spain.
In spite of the increased attention,

however,

there has been a

lack of clarity in the way the issues have been discussed.
in part to theoretical confusion.
general

analyses,

there

has

This is due

But, further, while there have been

been

little

work

in

comparing

actual

attempts to better understand the dynamics of these organizations.
order to redress this situation it
literature on worker

is necessary to draw out from the

ownership and control some
1

In

general concepts and

2
organizational principles.

This framework can then be used to analyze

the Iron Molders' cooperative attempts in the 1860's and the Mondragon
cooperatives of post-World War Two.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
In

11

,
II
cooperative
or

II

war k p 1ace

d emocracy II attempts,

measures of

success go beyond simply the technical capacity to produce at a profit.
A strong emphasis

is placed on equality and democratic ideals.

does not mean that the interests of capital are not important;
the interests of labor are assumed to be prior.

This

rather,

The result, theoreti-

cally, is that considerations of success are based in the "democratization" of both control and ownership.
zation of the firm needs to be

This means that the social organi-

democratic,

and that the control and

distribution of the surplus needs to be equitable.
1985:

21).

(Raymond Russell,

For workplace democracy, the ideal is for workers to col-

lectively own

the workplace,

work process.

It is this combination, in fact, that Russell identifies

as well as

as "democracy in the workplace."
oretical

to collectively control the

In this section I will review the the-

literature on worker cooperatives and try and identify those

factors which appear most important for success.

Social Organization
The most significant feature of social organization is that the
production process should be organized for the good of everyone in the
firm,
need

both individually
to

seen

as

and collectively.

communities,

since

the

In other words such firms
main

according to Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld,

3

purpose

of

each

firm,

is the "maximization of

4
community well-being.

This includes fair income for those who work in

the enterprise and workers'

control of their own work, within jobs as

personally rewarding as possible" (1982:
this ideal,

7).

perhaps no other principle is

In attempting to achieve

so necessary for success as

the one worker/one vote rule, which gives workers citizenship rights in
the firm.

This method of decision-making is preferred is preferred to

systems which give votes to workers as share-holders which seems inevitably to lead to degeneration of the democratic ideals as the interests
of capital take precedence over labor.

The attempt, then,

is to set up

an organizational social structure which prevents such degeneration from
occurring.
In traditional work systems the integrity of work for the majority
of workers has been broken down through various

forms

of "scientific

management," resulting in a controlling elite minority and an alienated
majority who never take part in,
whole.

or even see,

the work process as

a

The goal of the worker democracy movement is to equalize this

relationship, so that all workers can know and take part in the whole
production

process.

This

requires

a

reconceptualization of

rights and control rights in the organization.

property

Instead of an owner, or

in the case of the corporation a group of owners, having full rights of
use,

rights over the fruits,

and rights of abuse (Russell,

1985:

2),

such rights need to be held by workers as members or citizens, not as
owners.

David Ellerman, for example, argues for the necessity of chang-

ing the corporate structure by separating the book value of the firm
(e.g.

stock ownership)

from membership rights

(Ellerman,

1982:

312).

The point is to transform membership rights into personal, as opposed to
property rights.

5

This

reconceptualization of workers

as members with citizenship

rights is recognized by Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld who state this
explicitly:
profit,

"The main purpose of each firm is not the maximization of

but

the maximization of community well-being.

This

inc 1udes

fair income for those who work in the enterprise and workers' control of
their own work, with jobs as personally rewarding as possible"
7).

(1982:

Rothschild-Whitt stresses this again in stating that "Collective

organizations . . . strive toward the ideal of community.

Relationships

are to be holistic, affective, and of value in themselves" (RothschildWhitt,

1982:

30).

However,

these

notions

worker citizenship, and social ownership,
nity, are not simply ideals with no basis

of

industrial

democracy,

that is, of workplace commuin organization.

Theorists

have developed forms and means to try to realize these ideals.
One way to increase the possibility of this kind of organizations
success is to develop a democratic consciousness through education.
Whyte

and

Blasi point

out,

"Organizational

leaders must

develop

As
and

articulate an ideology that both justifies the form of organization and
guides

its development.

They must develop the organizational mission

beyond simply producing goods and services and providing jobs for
members" (Whyte and Blasi, 1984: 402).

its

This involves developing a dif-

ferent way of thinking about ones role in the organization and about the
purpose

of

"particular

the organization
attitudes

and

itself.

values

As

Bernstein states,

supportive

of,

and

there

necessary

are
for,

effective participation by workers and managers in the joint running of
the enterprise" (Bernstein,

1982: 69).

These attitudes

include flexi-

bility, compromise, receptivity to others, and acknowledgement of limits; the kind of things one would expect when a group is attempting to

6
cooperate, as relative equals, to get the job done.
It may be impractical to take democratic control to an extreme,
and say that everyone must have a say in all decisions,
equality of

roles within the

flexibility

in

how

firm.

democratic

However,

decision-making

and must have

even if one
takes

place,

allows

for

when

the

whole community is involved in decision-making--when electing managers
for example--voting should be on a one worker/one vote basis,
than on the basis of numbers of shares owned (see Ellerman,
Lindenfeld,

1982: 348).

rather

1982: 301;

It is equally important that voting and deci-

sion-making should take place on a face-to-face basis (Rothschild-Whitt,
1982: 28).

While this can be a cause of strain, and inhibit the success

of the firm due to conflicts and personality clash, as well as reduce
involvement due to shyness or lack of interest,

its value according to,

the firms ideals makes it necessary (Mansbridge, 1982).
One useful mechanism for encouraging the development of such consciousness is to limit hierarchical differences within the organization.
-

This may

involve limiting pay differentials, or it may mean the total

-elimination of a worker/management distinction or at least role rotation
(see Schlesinger and Bart, 1982: 142, and Johnson and Whyte, 1982: 180).
For the idealistic forms

of workplace democracy,

the choice would be

both collective organization and collective control.

While the extreme

is not necessary for the operation of relatively democratic structures,
it does seem necessary to limit the distance betweem top and bottom in
order to accomplish the desired sense of democracy.

The goal, here, is--

to allow workers as a group to increase their influence in the direc- tion of

the firm,

and thus

"scientifically managed" firm.

decrease

the alienation inherent

in the_.

7

If one accepts the continuation of a distinction between worker
and manager, which may occur given the allowance for relative equality,
workers must be allowed access to management level information.

This is

necessary so that they can make informed decisions in their role at the
top of the hierarchy as members in the firm.

In this capacity workers

direct the firm as a group, and initiate policy directions, which would
not be possible without such information.
Whyte and Blasi, 1984: 403).

(see Bernstein, 1982:

62;

Without such access, the the distinction-

may work to dichotomize members and thus violate the social ideals of the firm.
Other means for facilitating workplace democracy
imization of

rule use

(Rothschild-Whitt,

1982: 27-28),

include the minan

independent

judiciary to mediate disputes between parties within the firm, allowing
workers to feel free to disagree with management without getting fired
(Bernstein,

1982:

67),

and having the leadership which is willing to

encourage and works to build a democratic institution (Lindenfeld, 1982:
345).

Economic Organization
As important as the ideal of social organization is the ideal of
an equitible distribution of the surplus or profit that the firm produces.

Here it is generally thought that the members should share in

the surplus the firm produces after meeting set costs of production.
How this

is distributed varies

among all members,
scale basis,
terms

from equal division

to distribution based on hours worked,

and finally--and

of workplace

from firm to firm,

this

democracy ideals

is

the least

to a wage-

desirable option

in

- -according to the proportion of

8
184; Johnson

stocks owned (see Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld, 1982:
and Whyte, 1982:

184; and Bernstein, 1982: 73-76).

While the actual form that social ownership takes may vary,
idea behind it is the same.

the

Instead of ownership by an individual or a

small group of individuals, who may or may not be working within the
firm, ownership should be in the hands of the members of the firm, or to
a limited extent, those with a particular interest in the firm such as
members of the local community. This may mean simply that the means of
production should be socially owned and kept in

a trust

Whitt and Lindenfeld, 1982:

7).

increase workers'

in the success of the firm.

interest

(Rothschild-

One of the reasons for doing so is to
However,

actual benefits from making this change alone may be limited.

the

As Ham-

al. state, "Changing ownership alone has had some effect on

mer, et.

organizational committment and felt ownership in the firm.

It may also

reduce alienation from work, but it is not associated with higher levels
of

job

satisfaction,

itself" (1982:

106).

feelings

of

control,

or benefit

from

ownership

This means that the actual form ownership takes

may not significantly alter attitudes, but it is clear that certain
forms of ownership are more consistent with the ideals than others.
This has led some to question the importance of individual ownership itself in providing a significant answer

to workplace problems.

Bernstein, for example, states that ownership is not absolutely necessary for democratization, since the rights of membership are more important than those of ownership
1984:

401).

this fact.

(Bernstein,

1982:

76; Whyte and Blasi,

Raymond Russell uses the case of Yugoslavia to demonstrate
There the industry is socially owned, but the exact meaning

and organization of this ownership is not precisely defined. This case

9

demonstrates that the

important point is the social organization and

control of the firm, not individual ownership (Russell, 1985: 43).

The

result is collective ownership in which workers are owners by virtue of
their being citizens or members

in the

firm.

The primary issue in

social ownership then, seems to be transform the capitalistic notions of
property rights into a social or collective ownership.This reduces the
possibility of degeneration given employee stock ownership plans, which
tend to revert into joint-stock capitalist-looking firms.

This collec-

tive ownership form is preferred according to the firms ideals, and is
consistent with the citizenship ideals of social organization.

Workkers

become citizens of the firm, and as such could be said to "own" a share
in the firm as members, not as individualistic owners.
The consequence of this

collective ownership is the relatively

equal distribution of the surplus that is produced by the firm.

It is

in this way that the social organization of the firm pays off economical ly for the members.

This benefit should be seperated from wages,

which should be calculated at a fair rate, as this share is interest on
labor, not capital.

This seperation of wages and shares is consistent

with the ideals of the firm in which membership is valued apart from
ownership or production.

This distinguishes these firms from the typi-

cal corporation which pays out the surplus on the basis of ownership.
In addition to interest on labor and wages (which should be considered as an operating cost as is raw materials costs not as an aspect
of surplus distribution), these firms must also provide for the capital
needs of the firm.

Under-capitalization is a serious problem for these

firms, and if the surplus is paid out without regard to the necessity of
working capital and development capital, the firm will fail. The problem
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of insufficient capital seems to be the primary cause of failure
producer cooperatives.

If

the workers

owners, they will go bankrupt.

reward themselves

for

too much as

As such it is essential that a propor-

tion of the surplus be paid to

a working capital or capital reserve

fund.

Auxiliary Support Institutions
This leads to the third area which must be addressed:
for auxiliary support institutions.

the need

These become particularly important

if the cooperative attempts to operate in a "hostile" environment.

In

such a case, the firms do not get the same institutional support as an
ordinary firm,

and thus need to develop their own institutions.

may include social security, education,
tions, research and development firms,
as the financial institution.

These

legal and political organiza-

etc.

But, none is as important

Cooperatives are prone to under-capitali-

zation due in part to unwillingness of capitalist lending institutions
to provide support, hence they need to develop their own support system.
One

solution is

to

develop

an internal

banking

system

in which the

worker is credited with his portion of the surplus but which is kept by
the firm to provide capital, and which the worker can obtain only by
leaving the firm.
In addition to this more pragmatic consideration,

the ideals of

these firms also suggest that labor should hire capital rather than vice
versa (Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld, 1982:
possible,

there

must be

places

from

7). But, for this to be

which labor

can obtain

capital.

Given the reluctance of private banks to lend this capital, the development of worker created banking institutions may be the best solution.
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Along with the bank, it may be necessry for these firms to develop
other auxiliary institutions.
port, political support,

These may include:

education, legal sup-

research and development, etc.

Sirianni, for

example, suggests the importance of labor market boards and nationally
administered sabbatical programs

(Sirianni, 1984:

498), and Whyte and

Blasi state, "We see the necessity for building a regional and national
organizational infrastructure to provide information, action research,
and technical assistance to worker owned firms" (1984:
port of such an infrastructure with its

404).

The sup-

auxiliary institutions seems

necessary for the firms survival, as these firms do not receive support
from the existing structures which perceive them as bad risks, as undercutting the system, as threats to the American way, etc.

Problems
These firms, then, have a certain democratic ideal toward which
they aim.

They need to develop a social organization in keeping with

this ideal, as well as set up a means of distributing the material surplus of the firm.

However,

just because they set up an organization

which approximates their ideals does not mean they will automatically
succeed.

As Frank Lindenfeld states, "A caution:

are not a panacea.
adequate capital,

workers' cooperatives

Like other businesses, they need capital management,
and good marketing" (Lindenfeld,

1982:

351).

What

this means is that ideology and good organization alone will not ensure
success.

These firms must be able to produce at least enough profit to

refinance themselves, even if there is no surplus beyond wages for the
workers to share (A note here regarding fixing prices, it may be possible for these firms to undercut prices of other firms,

and sacrifice

12
their sharing of profit for a larger share of the market, but this may,
as the Iron Molders will demonstrate, be a short-lived benefit, as capitalists have-more resources, and are likely to win the war).
In addition to the problem of capital financing,
real

barriers

which

must

be

addressed.

Given

that

there are other
some

measure

of

democracy is desired, the issues of time and efficiency become important.

There is only so much time in the day, and workers have interests

outside the workplace,
and

participate

38-39).

in

so they don't have time to sit in all meetings

all

the

firms

decisions

(Rothschild-Whitt,

1982:

It may also be difficult for such meetings to be meaningful if

the firm

is too

large,

and representative democracy may be necessary

(Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld, 1982: 9).

There are also the Weberian

problems of institutionalization or bureaucratization, and oligarchization.

Quite often the tendency of these firms is to degenerate into the

kind of firms they reject (Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld, 1982: 11-13;
Johnson and Whyte, 1982:

195; and Sirianni, 1984:

500).

Possibilities
While these are real problems which must be addressed, it does not
mean that there is no hope for producer cooperation.

It is possible to

learn from the attempts of the past, and make the necessary adjustments.
This

may

stresses

mean
the

compromise

necessity of

rather than strictly
model which takes

is

necessary.

flexibility

and

Sirianni,
of a

abiding to the holistic

equality to its

full

extent

in

particular,

pluralistic

approach

or productive integrity
(Sirianni,

1984:

486).

While recognizing the reality of these limits, he does not make the mistake of

going to the pessimistic

extreme.

He feels

that

these real

13
problems can be

faced with relative success.

He states,

"Oligarchy,

persistent as it may be, is not wrought of iron" (Sirianni, 1984: 500).
The goal of relatively equal organizations,
and control, may be achieved.

both in terms of ownership

While there is no one best way for these

to organize, there are general areas of workplace organization which can
guide firms in clarifying what it is they want to achieve.

To better

understand what specifics may work in particular situations, it is useful to look at actual attempts and,

even if they were failures,

from these the principles of organizational success for the future.

draw

CHAPTER III

THE IRON MOLDERS
This

theoretical

framework

attempt to institute such ideals.

can

guide

the

study

of

an

actual

This is an attempt, by the Iron Mold-

er's Union, to develop a system of "Cooperation" in the iron industry in
the late 1860's.

But, before looking at this directly it will be help-

ful to set the historical stage to better understand what resources the
Molders

had available

to

make

such an

attempt.

This

also helps

to

understand why their attempt took the form of cooperation.

Historical Setting
The era in which the molders attempted cooperation was perhaps the
most rapidly changing era in American history.
nineteenth century,

"A society of small,

In the last half of the

owner-operated workshops and

factories dependent upon the skilled artisan evolved into a system of
mass-production, utilizing large numbers of unskilled laborers and dominated by huge trusts under the control of finance capitalism" (Derber,
1970:29).

Contrary to what may be presented in some of the sociological

literature, this change was not simply a smooth transition in which the
monopoly capitalist readily assumed a place of prominence, either with
the full support of workers, or due to the workers' lack of resources to
prevent such a transition.

Instead it was an era of conflict and resis-

tance, particularly on the part of skilled artisans who relied on the
traditionalistic ethic

and skilled knowledge for

14

resources of

resis-

15
tance.
This
the

reaction has been studied by Herbert Gutman who emphasizes

importance of looking at actual workers'

response within communi-

ties, rather than relying on broad historical reactions.
from

1843-1893

Gutman writes

that

there

Of the period

existed "a profound

tension

between the older American pre-industrial social-structure and the modernizing

institutions

that

capitalism" (Gutman, 1977a:
industrial

transformation

accompanied the
13).

development

of

industrial

During this time there was a radical

throughout

the

country,

and

the

skilled

craftsmen seem most susceptible to the negative affects of this on their
trade.

The reactions against this process were rooted in the community

ties and the ties within the trades themselves.

As Gutman says, "Gilded

Age artisans did not easily shed stubborn and time honored work-habits"
(Gutman, 1977a: 36).

These workers were able to draw support from their

artisan work-habits,

and their working class

resist threats to their trade.

community subculture

to

This was possible since the capitalists

they were resisting tended to come from outside the community and had
not yet established social status commensurate with their economic position.

As Gutman states, "Economic power was not easily translated into

social and political power, and the changes resulting from rapid industrialization stimulated sufficient opposition to the industrialist to
deprive him of the status and the authority he sought and needed" (Gutman, 1977d:

258).

At least at the beginning of this era of transition, then, workers
had important

resources

available for

resistance.

They were able to

draw on community support in their struggles against real and perceived
threats

from the capitalists.

They could utilize

the fact of their

16
skill-knowledge necessary to production in these pre-automation days,
and could actually,
1977c).

This

in certain cases, start their own firms

(Gutman,

ability to utilize their resources to begin their own

firms may not always have been in response to the threat of capitalists,
but it did serve as a ray of hope in times of strikes, lockouts, etc.
From Gutman's perspective, then, it is clear that this time in history
was not simply a time for despair for the skilled tradesman, it was a
time of action, response, and perhaps of hope that workers could fight
back against the system using skills
ideals.

It is this structure,

and traditionalistic,

community

in which workers were able to mobilize

their power, that the workers were trying to defend.

Based on a value-

system with a rich American heritage, they fought against its direct
opposite leading to the "Europeanisation" of America, and the "serfdom"
of all workers (Gutman, 1977a: 52-54).
David Montgomery also addresses skilled workers response to the
threats to their trades in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

He finds that it was possible for workers to resist because of

their knowledge over the production process, their moral code which governed behavior on the job, and which emphasized mutuality and the collective good

(Montgomery,

1983:

391).

This

combination proved very

important for these skilled workers, as "technical knowledge acquired on
the job was embedded in a mutualistic ethical code, also required on the
job, and together these provided skilled workers with considerable powers of resistance to the wishes of their employers" (Montgomery, 1979:
14).

One of the ways these resources were maintained was through the

use of the "stint," which was an output quota fixed by the workers and
not to be exceeded by any individual worker.

The argument for this was
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that "unlimited output led to slashed price rates, irregular employment,
drink and debauchery.

Rationally restricted output,

however,

reflected 'unselfish brotherhood,' personal dignity, and 'cultivation of
the mind.'"

This led to the development of wh,.at Montgomery calls a

"manly" bearing toward one's boss

(which meant the worker held his

ground and did not flinch before the boss's authority), as well as the
development of manliness toward ones fellow workers

(which primarily

meant not undermining or undercutting each others right to work by doing
more than one job's worth of work) (Montgomery, 1979: 13).

So, Montgom-

ery, too, argues that skilled workers in this period, particularly in
smaller towns, were not without resources to resist the threats to their
jobs.

They were able to draw on the traditions within their craft and

their community, as well as on their skills, to put up a fight; fights
ranged from negotiations, to strikes, to total breaks with the "capitalist" firm and starting their own firms.
This

traditionalistic

ethic

proved

particularly

determining the direction the labor movement would take.

important

in

The two pri-

mary options were reform unionism which was built on the ideals of the
traditonalistic consciousness, and trade unionism based on collective
bargaining, which was still

in its

infancy.

As

Gerald Grob states,

reform unionism was based
on a vision of past society where the independent artisan combined
in his own person both employer and employee functions.
. The
only legitimate division that they recognized was between the producing and the non-producing class, the former being given the stamp
of legitimacy and the latter marked for obliteration. The end objective of reform unionism was the creation of a society where all
would belong to the producing class, and the individual would combine in his own person both worker and employer functions (Grob,
1961: 7).
The most obvious means of achieving the elimination of the non-producing
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class and the need for capital, given their traditionalistic ideals, was
"cooperation."

As Selig Perlman states, "To the American worker, who

hankered to be rid of the capitalist 'boss,' a cooperative self-bossing
seemed almost as desirable as self-employment as an independent individual"

(Perlman,

1949: 190).

Cooperation, then,

came to be seen as the

means by which the workers could force the capitalists' hand by beating
them at their own game, while maintaining the traditionalistic ideology
intact, building on the American ideals of individualism and free-enterprise (Derber,

1970: 190).

It was seen as a means of eliminating the

wage-system, with its inherent tension between worker wages and capitalist profits (Grob, 1961: 15).

The primary advocate of such a system of

cooperation was the leader of the Iron Molders, William H.

Sylvis, "the

first great figure in the American labor movement" (Andrews, 1966: 7).
The Union and Cooperation

The Iron Molders Union was one of the earliest unions to make significant and lasting attempts at forming a national union.

The earliest

attempts were typically local, and were directed primarily toward wagecuts and abuses of the apprenticeship/helper system on the part of the
capitalists.

These arose only during lean years, and tended to disap-

pear when the economy improved.

The economic depression of 1857 brought

particularly bad conditions to the Molders, leading to wage reductions,
strict work

rules

nationwide scale.
particularly given

concerning contracts,

helpers,

Local unions had little success
the rise of

tools,

etc.,

on a

in fighting back,

employer combinations,

so

it became

increasingly clear that a wider base of operation was needed.

With Wil-

liam Sylvis leading the way, the Molders held their first national con-
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vention in Philadelphia on July 5, 1859.

This union increased steadily

in size, with forty-four locals represented at the 1861 national convention,

but then the Civil War,

front,

which sent many of the leaders to the

including Sylvis, almost resulted in the end of the union.

the 1863 convention, only fourteen locals were represented.

At

After being

elected president,

Sylvis was sent on a famous organizational trip to

revive the union.

The trip was a great success, as was Sylvis' presi-

dency, and the union grew quite strong (for a full history see Stockton,
1922).
The union that Sylvis was instrumental in organizing was built on
the tradional values and skills of the workers.

Daniel Walkowitz points

this out for the iron workers in Troy and Cohoes, NY:

"Industrial work-

ers settled into Troy and Cohoes, and established kinship groups in ethnic

working-class

facilitated

the

neighborhoods.
development

of

The
a

church

and

supportive

other

institutions

associational

network.

These institutions helped the workers adapt in the city and were important preconditions for protest" (Walkowitz, 1978:

137).

In addition to

this community support, there was also support within the trade itself.
As Montgomery

found

for

other trades,

stints and the workman's ethic.
output

levels had a

1968:

156).

this

quota,

molders'

the Molders

made use

of

The stint as a means of controlling

long tradition among the Iron Molders

(Stockton,

Molders battled fiercely over maintaining lower levels for
so as

jobs,

to

resist

as well as

over-production which threatened

their own

in the long run.

fellow

The workman's

ethic judged those who worked beyond the quotas as selfish and inhuman.
In fact, Stockton indicates that "one of the earliest rules of the Molders Union provided that no member should endanger the job of another
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member by working at a

lower rate of pay or even offering to do so"

(Stockton, 1968:

Sylvis himself states, "We hold it to be ingen-

137).

erous, if not inhuman,

for half a dozen men to transcend their physical

abilities by working late and early, to monopolize all the work in the
shop";

and again, "to retain the power of self-protection, we must be a

unit in heart and purpose, tolerating no innovation which secures a benefit to

one at the expense

of another"

(Stockton,

1968:

434,

435).

This support of each other went beyond the organization and rules of the
workplace,

and included

support

in sympathetic strikes

as well.

For

example, in Troy, NY, when 745 Molders were locked out, 750 iron workers
walked out

in support

(Walkowitz,

1978:

96;

see

also Ozanne,

1963:

160).
In addition to
community support,

this strength drawn from

the Molders

traditional ideals and

clearly benefited

from the

fact

their skills were essential to the production of iron, and as

that

long as

they maintained solidarity they could resist the threats to their craft
with a high degree of success.

The importance of their skills to pro-

duction may have led the Molders on to their next stage of union development, the push for cooperation.
Drawing on the past for a vision of the good society, and resting
secure in the irreplaceability of their skills,

the Molders attacked.

Through cooperation they hoped to set up the beginning of the end for
the non-producing class, and to eliminate the wage/capital division by
investing

both in one person, the worker/owner.

Milton Derber outlines

the ideals of the producer cooperatives as they existed in theory.

The

cooperative
was

intended

to eliminate the profit-maker

and to be run

on the
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principles of direct democracy by the owner producers. Each worker
would have a single vote;
the management would be selected by the
workers; and major policies would be determined by group discussion
and decision.
All workers would be co-owners so that the employer
employee relationship and the wages system operating within that
relationship would be eliminated. Outsiders would have no voice in
the government of the enterprise (Derber, 1970: 38-39).
While these goals may ultimately have been beyond reach, at this stage
they were seen as a realisable.

Trade unionism was seen ultimately as

contrary to achieving this ideal, serving instead as a necessary first
step that needed to be surpassed.

After addressing trade unionism as

important for organizing the movement, Sylvis stated, "'Cooperation' is
the next great step;

this taken, and we will have crossed the boundry

which has so long seperated man from his destiny . .

By cooperation,

we will become a nation of employers--the employers of our own labor"
(Sylvis, 1968: 168).

At the labor congress of the National Labor Union,

of which Sylvis was also president, cooperation was presented as a "sure
and lasting remedy for the abuses of the present industrial system, and
that until the laws of the nation can be remodeled so as to recognise
the rights of men instead of classes.

The system of cooperation care-

fully guarded will do much to lessen the evils of our present system"
(Andrews, 1966: 118-119).
high.

The hopes for cooperation, then, were quite

It was the means of ushering in the new society based on old

ideals, or put another way, ushering out the new, "corrupt" modern systern.
What the workers wanted most was

to secure the full

fruits

of

their labor, which meant for them the elimination of the wage system.
With their traditionalistic community

ideals,

these molders perceived

owners as denying workers their full share of the surplus.
states,

As Andrews

the cooperatives "were the efforts of workingmen to carry on
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their own as a form of productive cooperation which would give them the
whole product of their labor" (Andrews,

1966:

111).

Sylvis himself

contended that "Labor is the real source of all wealth" (Sylvis, 1968:
98).

This desire of labor to retain the full value of their labor was a

rooted in the
production.

earlier days of the semi-autonomous, non-factory craft

Sylvis was most adament on this need to eliminate wages:

For years I have been teaching the doctrine, that under the system
of paying wages to labor and profits to capital, there never was nor
never could be any identity of interest between employers and
employed. Both were activated by the same principle--to buy in the
cheapest and sell in the dearest market. The result could be nothing but antagonism (Sylvis, 1968: 390).
The solution to the inherent tension was to be cooperation which joined
worker and owner.

Cooperation was the "only way by which we can hope to

control the two elements of capital, labor and money, and take from the
few who arrogate to themselves the right to own the one and control the
other, the power they have ever employed to subjugate and degrade labor"
(Stockton, 1931: 262).

The system of wages, then, was very significant

in the selection of cooperation as the option to be pursued.

Rather

than accomodate, the workers sought to assert their authority which they
thought was sufficient given their ideology and their skills.
This abhorence of the wages system actually led molders to reject
trade unionism as an option, as Norman Ware indicates: "The reluctance
of the labor movement to accept collective bargaining as its major function was due largely to the fact that this involved an acceptance of the
wage system."
tive (Ware,

Given this, the best option was the producers' coopera-

1959: 320).

Others would later declare that this pursuit

actually hindered the progress of the labor movement by denying its only
true

resource

(Perlman,

1949;

Commons,

1966).

However, at the time
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reform unionism seemed the best option, and,

for perhaps the only time

on a significant scale, it dominated trade unionism. However,
not

last,

supreme

and by

(Grob,

the end

1961:

10).

of the
To

century trade

better

it would

unionism would

understand why

attempted, what it looked like , and why it failed,

reign

cooperation was

it will be helpful

to look at attempts at Troy, NY and Pittsburgh, PA, the two most significant cooperative ventures by the Molders.

The Troy Cooperative
After calling for cooperation for years, the Iron Molders saw it
first

attempted by the local iron molders

of Troy,

NY.

In Troy the

molders and the community as a whole had a shared value system which
drew upon communitarian,

traditionalistic values.

workers

in particular, was

Irish.

In 1860,

for

dominated by

instance,

Troy,

immigrants,

fifty-nine percent

and the iron

particularly the

of Troy's citizens

were foreign-born or the son or daughter of an immigrant, and among the
molders,

fifty-five per cent were Irish

(Walkowitz,

1974:

442,

437).

This proved to be important in the establishment of community ties and
values,

as workers could build on ethnic ties as well as shared work

experiences and skills.

Walkowitz, who has done several studies of the

iron workers in Troy, states, "A closer look at certain skilled and unskilled Troy workers
cultural

patterns

together.

that

helped

to

knit

the

cohesive family and

iron

worker

community

These patterns may provide clues to the attitudes,

and life-stule that
(Walkowitz,

during this period discloses

influenced the social behavior

1974: 444; see also p.

459).

values,

of these workers"

These ties were significant

in providing the resources needed to make efforts at resistance and con-
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The

trol.

department,

molders

had

the

support

of

the

Irish

dominated

as well as the Irish political machine,

police

and as such were

provided with assurances that their efforts at resistance would not be
opposed by the local political and legal authorities.
provided evidence
have suggested.

for solidarity,

rather than

As Walkowitz indicates,

Resistance, then,

disintegration as

some

"Violence and conflict, how-

ever, can reflect a certain integrity and organization within a strong
community.

Household

social

basis

efforts

of

of

and family

organization

resistance--the

structure provide

and

1866

protest"

molders

one index of

454).

(1974:

strike

lasted

a

the

Extended
period

of

months--would not have been possible without this supportive network.
It was a

result of this

1866 strike that the molders established the

first cooperative foundry which would serve as a ray of hope for molders
nation-wide, and it is clear that the community solidarity was significant in its establishment.
. While the strike turned out to be a triumph for the molders who
won and returned to work, it was hoped that its most significant product
would be the formation of the cooperative foundry.

Financed by local

molders, they hoped it would serve as the model for the future of the
molding industry.
the

principles

The idea was to set up a foundry which was based on

of

democracy,

worker

ownership,

and

worker

control.

While the specifics of the program are not as clear as the later Pittsburgh attempt, it is clear that they looked to the Rochdale pioneers for
guidance.

E. W.

Bemis does give some idea of the organization at the

Troy cooperative in terms of ownership and profit distribution:

"Out of

any profits there was to be paid first an interest of 10% on capital,
and all the rest of the profits were to be divided equally between each
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stockholder working for the company, without

regard to the stock he

held, though only one vote was given to a member.

All the stockholders

did not work in the foundry" (Stockton, 1931: 272).

From these princi-

ples it can be seen that the molders sought, in Russell's terms, to have
collective ownership and collective control of the foundry.
1866 the Cooperative Stone Works was founded,
already a success.

At this time

11

In April

and by December it was

32 men were reported at work and were

said to be earning an average of $30 a week, a sum greatly in excess of
prevailing wages.

While the capitalization amounted only to $30, 000,

real estate and 'stock' were held to the value of $50,000.

From May,

1866, to January, 1867, the business done aggregated $100,000 11 (Stockton,

1931:

264).

It

later came

to employ

over

fifty people

who

received, in addition to wages, two dollars per day in cooperative profits.

They also had more contracts than they could handle.

This success

excited many other cooperative attempts, the most significant of which
was in Pittsburgh.

The Pittsburgh Cooperative
In 1867 about 150 Pittsburgh molders were involved in a long and
bitter strike.
of resistance.

The word from Troy provided hope of an alternative form
Sylvis in particular

jumped on this

opportunity and

argued that the Molders Union as a whole should get involved in ownership through cooperation.

The details of the organization at Pittsburgh

are clearer than at Troy, due in part to more documentation because of
its national ownership, but there is
heavily on the principles used at Troy.

reason to believe that

it drew

The plan was described by Syl-

vis in his presidential report to the Toronto session of the Iron Mold-
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ers International Union on July 8, 1868.

$100,000 was to be raised in

capital stock by way of 20,000 shares sold at
individual

or union was

to

own more

than

five dollars each.

400

shares

($2, 000).

No
The

foundry association at Pittsburgh was not bound to redeem any share of
its capital stock within two years of the date of subscription, and in
no case without three months notice.
than one vote on any question,
held.

No shareholder was to have more

regardless of the number of shares he

Five percent of the profits was to go into a sinking fund not to

exceed $10,000, fifteen percent of profits to shareholders in proportion
to the amount held by each as interest on capital,

and the balance to

shareholders in proportion to the amount of wages received from work in
the association, as interest on labor.
vidual molder, was

required to buy at

The Pittsburgh union, or indileast 500 shares,

and no stock

could be sold or transferred to any person who was not a member of a
molders' union without consent of the Board of Directors.
tially seemed a good one.
tal

by broadening the

It addressed the issue of insufficient capi-

base

amount necessary to invest.

The plan ini-

of

available

capital

and minimizing the

And, it addressed the issue of degeneration

by limiting the benefits of investment on capital and increasing the
benefits of labor.

These seemed to be the two biggest problems faced by

cooperatives, and if successful, it was expected that cooperatives would
sweep across the iron industry and all of industrial America as well.
As it was, new cooperatives continued to spring up in the wake of the
success at Troy and Pittsburgh.

However, the enthusiasm was short-lived

as both eventually failed as cooperative ventures.
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Failure
The
became

direction

capitalist

in which

firms

both

failed was similar:

degenerating into

both

quickly

joint-stock companies.

In

Troy the lack of a substantial return on capital led to changes in the
organization of

the foundry.

Wage

earners

there realized

that

they

could benefit best by keeping their profits below 10% as not all stockholders worked

in the plant.

This

led those with larger numbers of

shares and those who did not work in the plant to amend the constitution
so

that each

shares.

stockholder

could vote according

to

the

number of

his

The result was that wages were reduced and profits were divided

as in a joint-stock company (Stockton, 1931: 272).
interest on labor disappeared.

The notion of paying

As capitalists themselves, the wage sys-

tem did not seem so bad after all.
quickly adopted the capitalist view.

As Andrews states, "The cooperators
. . That these capitalistic coop-

erators were less eager for leisure to improve body and mind than they
had been as trade unionists, is apparent" (Andrews,

1966:

54).

When

faced with the prospects of increasing their share in the profits individually,

even at the expense of other molders,

become less important.

the ideals

seemed to

The main problem, then, seems to have been the

demand on the part of the stockholders, even as members, for increased
return on capital (Walkowitz, 1978: 185), leading to the degeneration of
the firm from a cooperative venture into a joint-stock company.
Pittsburgh followed a similar path.

The failure here, as in Troy,

was directly related to the problem of capital:
cult,

and

result.

getting it was diffi-

those who supplied it wanted to profit significantly
The International

Union gave in to

these demands,

as a

seemingly

without much resistance, and drastically changed the way that the sur-
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plus was distributed.
and

80~~

Rather than 5% reserve, 15% interest on capital

interest on labor,

the distribution was set up that foundries

owned by the Molders Union would pay 12% on capital reserves, 12% on
labor and 76% to be determined by the stockholders (Grossman, 1973: 215;
Derber, 1970: 38).

In commenting on this change Grossman states, "The

financial structure of these pseudo-coops was such that, regardless of
the number of owners, self-interest would pervert to private gain any
benefits that might accrue to labor in a genuine cooperative" (Grossman,
1973:

216).

However,

as

Grossman indicates,

the

failures

of

this

foundry in its attempt at as a cooperative went beyond just the problem
of capital and into all areas of organization:
eratives were legion.

"The sins of these coop-

The ideals of every cooperative champion

were here violated" (1973: 217).

It is possible now to look at the sins

of the molders in their cooperatives and thus to better understand the
issues that such ventures must face if they are to be successful.
The problems that cooperation faced were not specific only to Troy
and Pittsburgh.

All attempted cooperatives faced similar problems, and

seemingly all failed to meet the challenge.

As Stockton says, "The his-

tory of the Molders' experiments can be summed up by stating that all
cooperative or quasi-cooperative foundries which were established ultimately ended as business failures or else became partnerships or jointstock companies" (Stockton, 1931: 269).

It is possible to analyze this

failure in general terms and from this learn about the possibility of
future cooperative attempts.

This analysis of problems can be guided by

the three theoretical areas identified above.
In the area of social organization it is clear that the Molders
were

unsuccessful

in

maintaining

the

democratic

ideals

of

relative
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equality.
tion,

This problem of social equality is associted with degenera-

as may be clear, is closely related to the problem of capital.

Troy and Pittsburg demonstrate that those who dared to invest capital
sought greater returns. Even though the one member/one vote policy would
seem to dictate against it, they were able to change the rules to the
benefits of capital rather than labor.

Why this happened, and why even

Sylvis did not seem to object, is not entirely clear.

It may be that

the majority of workers thought they could benefit from this system by
way of

stock-ownership.

Given

would not expect such a change.

the abhorance

of the

wage system one

Nonetheless, such a change was made and

the result was the abandonment of the ideals on which the cooperative
was built.

Foner summarizes this process:

The molders soon discovered that
world, co-op foundries had to
Stockholders demanded more and
demands the co-operatives were
working hours, and abolish union

in order to exist in a competitive
abandon co-operative principles.
more profits, and to meet these
forced to reduce wages, lengthen
standards (Foner, 1947: 419).

While this assessment seems harsh, the evidence from this period does
not allow for a positive assessment.
seem seemed to lead

to the

Again and again the stockholders

abandonment of

cooperative principles

by

their call for increased profits (Walkowitz, 1978: 185; Grob, 1961: 20;
Perlman, 1949:

191; and Grossman,

cooperative attempt

1973:

is always the same:

216).

The conclusion of this

"No shop or factory has been

able to maintain efficiency where the workers themselves own and operate
the plant.

If the business succeeds, the original workers become manag-

ers and stockholders, employing men in a purely wage capacity, or some
sort of paternalism is set up such as profit sharing and copartnership"
(Ware, 1959: 322).
The second cause of failure also falls under the area of social
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organization.

This involved the cooperators inability to retain manag-

ers or their lack of recognizing the importance of manager's skills in
the production process.

Not surprisingly, there was an inherent tension

between workers and managers.

There was "constant criticism directed

against the managers of cooperative plants by their associates.

Indeed,

it was perhaps the 'commonest mistake' of the molders not to recognize
and reward managerial ability" (Stockton, 1931: 274).
the managers

abandoning the cooperative

firms

for

This resulted in
greener pastures.

"Those who possessed the talent {of managerial skill} did not
remain in the movement, but

left

long

and used their abilities in

directing their own plants" (Grossman, 1973: 211).

It is ironic, but

not surprising that those who sought to establish an ideal based on
their skills failed to realize the importance of the skill of the managers.
The third cause of failure of these cooperatives, also in the area
of social organization, which seems surprisingly common to most producer
cooperatives, was the hiring of non-member workers.

This directly con-

tradicts the principle of workers having rights as members in the firm,
as well as the one member/one vote rule.

While this problem does not

attract much attention in the literature on the molders, there is evidence that it may have been more widespread than suspected.

In certain

foundries it was found that up to one-third of the work-force were nonstockholders

(Stockton,

1931:

271).

This

clearly grew out

of the

transformation of the laborers into capitalists who sought to maximize
their profits.

Perlman indicates that, as successful cooperatives grew,

they tended to hire labor rather than extend membership, which undercut
the ideals and quickened the transition to a joint-stock model.
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The fourth,

and perhaps the most serious,

under-capitalization.

Even though the capital needed to finance these

ventures was

relatively modest

from

to

$15,000

cause of failure was

$20,000,

compared to

this

other industries,

obstacle was

nonetheless

ranging

formidable.

Grossman states that "the immediate cause of death was acute financial
malnutrition"

(Grossman,

1973:

211).

Pittsburgh

provides

a

classic

example of this as the molders were short of working capital and a credi ter called in a debt, forcing the foundry to sell out to pay the bill
(Grossman, 1973: 206).

Part of the reason for this lack of capital was

the actual size of these firms.

The typical firm attempting a coopera-

tive consisted of thirty to forty workers who simply did not have the
money necessary to fully support the foundry (Stockton, 1931: 273), and
banks were unwilling to risk such loans.

This issue of raising capital,

then, is a real problem that must be addressed by producer cooperatives
(Andrews, 1966:

112).

It would be a mistake, however,
failed to recognize this problem.

to think that these cooperators

In fact,

it was one of the major

problems that they battled against, arguing that the non-producing class
should not be able to maintain such power and control over the actual
producers

of

that

surplus.

To

battle

this

problem

they

supported

"Greenbackism" as a means by which capital would be easier to obtain,
they looked for state support of cooperative movements and, as seen with
Pittsburgh,
obtained.

tried

to

broaden

the

base

from

which

capital

could

be

Sylvis even suggested the importance of a national coopera-

tive bank and other auxiliary institutions to provide support for cooperative efforts

including education,

home and

building societies (Sylvis, 1968: 200-204).

land associations,

and

However, these institutions
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failed to materialize, the political action failed to effect significant
change, and the distribution of stock to employees outside the firm
often led to the next cause of failure, degeneration of the firm into a
joint-stock company.
The fifth cause of failure, also in the area of economic organization, and which may ultimately have turned molders away from cooperation, was the practice of undercutting the prices of other shops.

While

it seemed to these cooperators that such price-cutting was necessary to
gain access into the market, the effect on other molders was negative in
terms

of wages

(Stockton,

1931:

270).

The cooperators

could accept

lower wages since they received a proportion of the capital as well, but
the non-cooperative factories

lowered wages

to

compete.

Given this

practice it is not surprising that cooperative foundries were successful
initially, but ultimately fell into disfavor with the majority of the
workers (Commons, 1966: 54, and Perlman, 1949: 191).

This was because

their undercutting was seen as a violation of one of the basic principles of the workingman's ethic.

As such, the cooperative movement which

was based on this traditional code may actually have worked against what
it stood for.
The sixth cause was the failure of the molders to establish auxiliary support institutions.
such institutions,

While they were aware of the importance of

for various

reasons these were never established.

Given the short period of time in which these firms existed as cooperatives it may have been impossible to develop such institutions

from

within, but the lack of their development may have made certain the
failure.
The final cause of failure is the conditions under which all of
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these cooperatives were established.

The fact that cooperatives were

established during times of labor unrest, strikes,
have

contributed to the

difficulty

they

found in

lockouts, etc., may
achieving

success.

This was due primarily to the inability of unemployed workers to provide
the necessary capital, and the need of the union to provide striking
workers with support.

Sylvis indicates that at the time the Pittsburgh

foundry began at least one-half of the molders membership was out of
work, some of their severest strikes had to be supported, and nearly all
of the membership was poor.

This made the possibilities

accumulation extremely slim.

Related to this,

once

for capital

the decision was

made to build, was the sense of urgency drove the projects faster than
intelligent management would have suggested.

The result often was poor

planning.
In addition to these causes of failure the molders' example demonstrates at

least two

important things

about what

may or

may not

be

needed for a successful producer cooperative.

The molders example dem-

onstrates

relative equality

that

sharing skill

guarantee of success.

knowledge with

is

no

Those molders who ventured into these cooperative

attempts were skilled workers,

but they failed nonetheless.

As such,

equality of knowledge in the workplace may be a nice ideal, but it is
obviously not sufficient for the success of a cooperative firm.

Hand-

in-hand with this is the fact that the failure of coops is not due to
increased technology which strips the workers of control over the work
process, limiting the possibilities for cooperation.
molders,

automation was not a

factor until at

In the case of the

least the 1880 's, well

after the cooperative attempt had failed (Stockton, 1922: 37).

In fact

it may have been the iron industry's resistance to mechanization, among
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other things, which later resulted in its downfall and the rise of steel
(Brody, 1960: 8-9).

A Reassessment
The Iron Molders' attempt at cooperation, then, may be said to be
a complete failure.

It failed in its ideals of worker ownership and in

its ideals of workplace control.

Some would later contend that it set

the labor movement back from achieving control in the only way it could:
trade unionism.

In

been kind.

movement

The

fact,

history's treatment of
has

been seen

as

an

cooperation has not

idealistic attempt

to

retain an increasingly out-moded way of life and word, and it was a mistake on

the part

of workers

3-4; Perlman, 1949).

to resist

modernization

(Commons,

1966:

However, recent attempts at workplace democratiza-

tion have brought about a review of producer cooperatives and a reassessment of their ability to succeed.
the historical record

This has included a reanalysis of

to better understand under what conditions and

which organizational structures of producer cooperatives both succeed
and fail

(see Jones and Svejnar, 1982;

Conte,

1982; and Jones, 1984).

In a similar way the case of the molders can be used to better understand the workplace democracy movement's

agenda for success and expan-

sion of the literature.
It
have

is clear that while the basic principles of cooperation may

been

sound,

the

methods

for

degeneration were not sufficient.
means by which the
involve

a

system of

encouraging

split off from membership.

and

resisting

It seems that one must institute some

degeneration process
ownership

capital

other

can be prevented.

than stock-ownership,

This

may

even when

It is also apparent that ideology alone will
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not serve this purpose.

The ethic of the workers which gave rise to the

cooperative impulse was in turn undercut by its own creation through the
undercutting of prices and violation of production quotas.

While this

is not a particularly new conclusion regarding producer cooperatives, it
is significant in terms of the suggestion of eliminating stock-ownership.

There are many who still want to maintain stock-ownership, split-

ting it off from voting rights, but the molders demonstrated that this
may not be enough.

It seems that our conception of the rights over pri-

vate property are too strong, and the methods for prevention of degenerat ion too weak

to allow for this.

Continuing stock-ownership sounds

good in theory, but it seems to not work well in practice.
The case of the Iron Molders, then, may have been a complete failure in terms of cooperation at the time, but it can be instructive in
helping to establish

the principles

for

the

success of cooperatives.

The ideals are in keeping with the ideals of the present-day push for
workplace democracy,

and the basic plan seems to be sound.

The fact

that we can learn from this failure is evident in the success of another
producer cooperative attempt, Mondragon.

The basic principles of organ-

ization are similar in both, but Mondragon has been more successful in
eliminating the possibility of degeneration.

While the case at Mondra-

gon may not be the ideal either, it is a step in the right direction
from

the

failure

of

the

Iron

Molders;

from

it

we

increase the possibility of workplace democracy as
American workers.

If the Iron Molders'

a

may

continue

to

real option for

attempt could be revised,

it

would be possible to argue from strong American ideals, as did the Molders, and avoid accusations of communism, which mark movements for doom
in the United States,

and thus

increase the possibility of receptance
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and success.

CHAPTER IV

MONDRAGON
The failure of the Iron Molders can be compared to the success of
the group of cooperatives centered around Mondragon, Spain.

Here, too,

the three theoretical areas--social organization, ownership and distribution

of

surplus,

and

auxiliary

support

institutions--provide

framework for analyzing the cooperative enterprises.

the

This comparative

analysis of Mondragon in comparison can help highlight the essential
organizational features for cooperation.
History

"Mondragon", as the system of cooperatives is often called, has
its roots in a two-year technical school that was founded in Mondragon,
Spain in 1943 by Jose Maria Arizmendi.

Arizmendi was a Catholic priest

with a social concience whose primary role in the formation of the cooperatives was

as idea man and as inspiration.

In terms of hands on

effects, he carried out much of the legal research to find an appropriate organizational form within Spanish law.
tial aspect of

He also provided the essen-

self-criticism on the part of the firm,

analyzing

problems for solutions rather revelling in success (Campbell, et. al.,
1977: 23).

The Technical Training School opened with the help of commu-

nity support, and in partial opposition to the town hall and the city's
primary industrial company, with an enrollment of twenty.

In 1948 its

success led to the founding of the League of Education and Culture which
37
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gave legal status to the school and which still is the organization
behind the educational system.

Of the initial graduates of the techni-

cal school, eleven went on to obtain credentials from an established
Five of these returned to Mondragon and with the

engineering school.

help of Arizmendi decided to set up their own cooperative firm to put
the ideas learned from Arizmendi into practice.
In 1956 Ulgor was founded as a limited liability corporation under
Spanish law.

It took two years of legal research to finally reach a

better legal position, under cooperative law, which was consistent with
their ideals.

To start Ulgor, the five raised eleven million pesatas

(1980 100 pesata
nity.

=

$1.43 U.S.) from friends, relatives, and the commu-

Their first products were paraffin-fueled space heating stoves.

They later added a line in electrical parts, and in 1958 started a casting shop and foundry.

In this year they also added butane-fueled cook-

ers and heaters which brought the first assembly-lines, which were seen
In 1959, along with two other cooperatives,

as necessary to compete.

they recognized the need of a support institution to achieve the goals
of financial stability and expansion.

The result was the Caja Laboral

Popular (CLP), or Peoples Savings Bank, which began to operate in 1960.
In addition to providing investment funding, the bank was also to provide professional expertise for
security benefits.

the cooperatives,

as well

The Contract of Association was

as

social

developed by the

CLP, which set the terms which cooperatives must follow to be a part of
this cooperative network.

This included organizational implementation

of the ideals of social control and equitable surplus distribution.
In 1966 Alecoop,

a cooperative educational

foundry, was

estab-

lished to provide training and retraining, and was financed by student
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workers who worked in the foundry five hours and then were in school
five hours per day.

In 1968 Eroski, a consumers cooperative, was formed

by an amalgamation of already exixting consumer cooperatives.

In 1970

Lagun-Aro was established as a seperate cooperative from the CLP to provide for social security and health care benefits.

In 1974 there was a

strike in Ulgor, the largest cooperative with over 4,000 workers,
the

result

was

a

reanalysis

of

actual worker

input.

This

in

and
turn

resulted in the institutionalization of creative worker input, gradual
phasing-out
attempts toe
From

of Tayloristic

principles

of

limit numbers

of workers

in cooperatives

1978-1980 plans

were

made,

also

in

scientific management,

response

and

to about

400.

to pressures

from

inside and outside, to group cooperatives into federations so as to take
advantage of economies of scale while staying true to cooperative ideals
(Historical

information

from Thomas

and

Logan,

1982:

14-38;

Eaton,

1978: 478; Gutierrez-Johnson, 1978: 267; Bradley and Gelb, 1981: 213).
The cooperative system has grown from the initial 24 workers of
Ulgor in

1956 to

agro-industrial

include,

concerns,

in

1984,

165

cooperative organizations,

14 building companies,

3

7

service organiza-

tions, and a system of consumer cooperatives serving 75, 000.

The CLP

has 132 branches in the Basque region and $1 billion (U.S.) in assets.
There were

over 18, 000 workers

in

the various

cooperatives,

and the

cooperators made up about 10% of the Guiporcoa region (Gutierrez-Johnson, 1984: 35).
alone,

From these figures it is clear that, in terms of growth

the Mondragon system of cooperatives

(Bradley and Gelb,

1981:

213).

Even the critics must admit as much.

The question becomes whether or not
becoming an economic success.

is an established success

it has stuck to its ideals while
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Social Organization
Looking first at the social organization of the cooperatives, the
goal was

to develop a democratically organized and relatively equal

work-force.

In order to enhance this possibility participation in the

social organization is based on membership, and therefore labor, rather
than on

capital

investment

(Campbell,

1977:

26).

This

enables the

establishment of the one member/one vote principle which is essential
for avoiding the degeneration of the democratic

ideals

(Saive,

1980:

226). This does not mean, however, that all members are strictly equal.
There is, in fact, a relatively clear hierarchy, but ultimately, at the
top of the "pyramid" is the general assembly which includes all members,
drawing attention back to the democratic base (Campbell, 1977: 30).
Organizational Structure
The organization of the individual cooperative firm does have a
clear structure.

Bradley and Gelb point out that

the actual organiza-

tion of the firm "does not differ too greatly from that of a capitalist
corporation" (1981:

213).

However,

necessitate similarity of result.

the apparent similarities do not
The main difference stems from the

fact that it is the members rather than the share holders who hold ultimate power (Saive, 1980: 226-230).
The general meeting is the forum for the expression of the collective will of the cooperators in directing the firm.

It is normally held

annually by the management committee, but in extraordinary circumstances
can be called at any time by the management committee or one-third of
the staff of workers.

Below the general assembly is the management com-

mittee or Junta Rectora.

The members of this committee are elected by
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all

workers

at

a

special

general

meeting.

The

committee

usually

inc 1udes a president, a vice-president, and six other members of the
firm.

They are elected for four years,

and every two years at least

half the seats must be subject to election.

This committee has the man-

agerial powers over the firm, much as in a capitalist firm, and is given
a certain degree of authority which almost appears to include autonomy.
The general assembly also elects three members to a supervisory board
whose task it is to monitor, clarify, and verify the financial situation
of the

cooperative and

report back

to the

general assembly.

Also

elected is the president, for not less than four years, whose task it is
to implement the general management plan which is drawn up by the management board and submitted to the management committee for approval.
The management board links the management committee and the president,
and meets once per month.

It also serves as an inter-departmental co-

ordinator, linking the policy-making body and the executive management.
This, then, is the hierarchical organization of the firm, which does in
fact look somewhat like the capitalist firm, but the difference is in
how policy is set, how decisions are made, and where ultimate authority
rests.
The Social Council
In addition to their ultimate authority as members, their determination of policy, and their selection of management, cooperators also
have recourse to another form of authority as workers.
social council.

The social council

This is the

is elected by groups

of ten to

twenty employees who choose one of their members as a representative.
It meets once a week to facilitate information flow (Saive, 1980: 230).
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This council

is meant

as a

means

for

workers

to

have an

influence on matters of policy and social benefits
1984: 395).

additional

(Whyte and Blasi,

The attempt is to provide workers an opportunity for input

as workers, not as the more general classification of members.

As Ana

Gutierrez-Johnson states, "The social council was conceived as a means
for the

expression of

the collective preferences of

the members,

workers, regarding all terms and conditions of work" (1984: 38).
ever,

the

one strike that has

occurred at Mondragon arose,

as

How-

in part,

because of the lack of real authority to influence management in this
way.

As a result, there have been attempts to increase the institution-

alized power of the social board.

For example,

the social board now

"has direct access to both the general manager and the control board to
whom it can represent the human, as opposed to commercial, requirements
of the workers" (Campbell, 1977: 25-26).

Also, management now consults

with the social council on all major question, and when a social council
recommendation is rejected by management, the council has the power to
call a meeting of the general assembly to overrule management if it so
chooses

(Whyte

and

Blasi,

1984:

395).

In

some

respects,

then,

the

social council acts like a labor union to represent the workers of the
firm to management.

Therefore, the "workers" have control over manage-

ment from both "top" and "bottom."
Looking at the social organization as a whole,
that

then, it appears

in spite of a capitalist-firm-like hierarchy there is

principle of democratic input in the organiation.

clearly a

This occurs from tip

down via the general meeting, and from bottom up via the social council.
Saive comments on this structure stating,
making these arrangements the movement demonstrated its ability to
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establish a number of differentiated levels of decision-making at
which the individual member can exercise a real influence and thus
plays an active rather than a passive role.
In fact, since decision-making is conducted in a democratic manner, the system is an
alternative to that of centraliation (1980: 243).
The

social

organization

of

the

firm

makes

possible

the

practical

achievement of ideals of democratic organization without inhibiting the
capital-growth success of the firm.
Managers
At Mondragon there is a continuation of the split betweeen worker
and manager, with the manager having a certain degree of autonomy in the
daily affairs of the firm.

The main reason for allowing this is respect

for the managers' expertise and of their necessity in a modern, technical firm.

As Campbell indicates, the social structure works "to ensure

that the reality of democratic control does not interfere with effective
management.

The control board has the power to hire and fire top man-

agement, but unless prepared to use this final sanction must leave managers to manage" (Campbell, 1977: 31).

Gutierrez-Johnson echoes this in

stating, "The Workers elect the ruling and executive bodies, but once
elected these have all the authority they need to perform their offices.
Management is appointed and given jurisdiction over areas of decision
which cannot be challenged by subordinates; however, it is accountable
to the collective of members at the end of the term" (1978: 281).

So,

while the managers have a certain degree of autonomy, it is not ultimate, and the strengthening of the social council may further limit any
possibilities for real autonomy.
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Size and Technique
Another

factor associated with the

social organization of the

firm, and which may play a role in the success of the firm, is its size.
To some extnent this fact was made

clear after the 1974 strike.

It

became apparent that in order to stay true to democratic ideals they
simply had to limit firm size.

Eaton supports this in stating, "Improv-

ing the quality of working life is closely associated with the question
of enterprise size" (1978: 482).

There seems to be a general consensus

that firms of about 200 are very workable, while the upper practical
limit may be about 500 (Gutierrez-Johnson and Whyte, 1982: 196).

Asso-

ciated with concern the about size--and also growing out of the strike--is concern with limiting Tayloristic production techniques, which are
seen as running counter to the ideals of the cooperatives.

A research

team was sent to Volvo in Sweden to study their production techniques so
as to adapt them to the Mondragon situation.

There is also an effort on

the part of the research and development cooperative to develop appropriate production techniques.

But, the changeover is costly and may not

have progressed in already existing firms as swiftly as the ideals may
dictate.

In new firms, however, both size and techniques are carefully

considered.
Discipline
In order to establish a sense of community and shared interests,
which includes a certain degree of collective control over members, Mondradon has established a system of discipline.
cate that,

Bradley and Gelb indi-

"Work discipline is closely regulated by rules internal to

each cooperative.

. Penalties range from written warnings through
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suspension to losses of income for up to sixty days.

Striking against

the management is punishable by expulsion" (1981: 215).

The main reason

for these relatively harsh penalties is to ensure a relatively "cooperative" work atmosphere.

This is

indicated in the cooperative statutes,

which Gutierrez-Johnson reproduces in part:
quate

organizational

climate,

both

"In order to ensure an ade-

social-

and

work-related,

some

infractions of the cooperative regulations will be subjected to sanctions"

(1980:

286).

Infractions

range

from

mild

(such

as

excessive

lateness or absenteeism,

lack of regard for politeness, cleanliness) to

very

fraud,

serious

(including

theft,

damage

to

materials,

These sanctions, then, are a means of maintaining the

etc.).

tive spirit." It

strikes,
II

cooper a-

is of course possible that these could be taken too

far, in which case they would contradict ideals, but the intention is to
form a degree of solidarity and stability.

Self-Criticism
The final issue I want to address in the area of social control is
the relative flexibility and openness to change rooted in the self-criticism provided by the cooperators

in

the firm.

While this

was made

clear after the strike, there is a clear history of such analysis in the
cooperatives going back to Arizmendi himself.

This ablity must be con-

sidered an asset to the cooperative form at Mondragon.
Oramchea, the general manager of the bank,
change,

well

cooperators

then one
have

changes.

clearly opted

change
to

make

As Jose Maria

indicates, "'If one has to

•
1s
necessary.

history"

I

The

(Clamp,

Mondragon

1983:

Campbell indicates that this process of reanalysis does not stop:

11).
"The

process of self-criticism and adaptation is continuous with the single
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overriding aim of matching their structures, to the needs of individual

'
human beings and the community"
made for

changing the

(1977: 25).

As long as decisions are

organization based ultimately on

labor rather than capital,

it seems

the needs

of

likely that the democratic ideals
/'

will continue to be represented in the social organization of the structure.

Economic Organization
The second area which must be analyzed is the the economic structure of the organization.
ing a

member of a

Perhaps it is best here to start with becom-

cooperative.

There are two

wys .

To get

into an

existing cooperative, a worker has to contribute about 250,000 pesatas
in 1980.

This can be obtained by having the money taken out of the

worker's share of the surplus

for the first year if he or she cannot

otherwise come up with the money.

Of this money, 25% is paid into the

cooperative's reserves and is not reimbursable, while the remainder is
credited to the worker's capital account.
cooperative is to start a new one.

The other way to get in to a

This involves developing a detailed

plan between the group desiring to start the cooperative and the Caja
Laboral Popular (CLP),

"the people's bank."

The workers must contrib-

ute 20% of initial capital, while the government of Spain contributes
20% as a part of industrial expansion policy.
from the CLP which,
success.

The remaining 60% comes

as a cooperative, has a large stake in the firm's
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Capital Accounts
The economic structure varies little from firm to firm due to the
Contract of Association.

All

firms

must

agree to this

become part of the cooperative system and share in the CLP.
number of common features cam be identified.

contract to
As such, a

First, all workers are

given a share of the profit based primarily on two factors:
of hours worked, and their rating on the "labor index."

the number

Saive explains,

"This rating depends on the qualifications and experiences of the worker
conserned, the level of responsiblity assigned to him, and his attitude
toward his work.

Other factors, such as seniority in the enterprise,

overtime worked,

arduous or unpleasant elememts in his job, are also

taken into account" (1980: 231-232).

Once the surplus is calculated for

the worker, it is credited to the workers' individual capital account in
the CLP.

An annual interest

rate is paid on this capital (6%--incash

when possible), so the cooperative views the capital, which it retains
in the bank, as a debt owed to the worker

(Gutierrez-Johnson,

1978:

277).
However, not all the surplus goes to the credit of workers' capital accounts.

In fact, of the surplus, approximately 70% goes to the

members in the proportions described above.

The remaining 30% is split

into two parts varying in proportion based on earnings of the firm.
Thus, approximately 15% of the total surplus goes into a capital reserve
maintained in the part of the firm as working capital, and the remaining
15% goes into a social works fund which is used to support education,
recreational facilities, and health facilities in the cooperative's community (Eaton, 1979: 34).

This means that the firm is able to retain in

bank accounts approximately 85% of the surplus

for reinvestment pur-
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poses, as limitations are placed on the workers' ability to withdraw his
capital from the bank.

Reasons for leaving determine the percentage of

capital the exiting worker can withdraw.
he or she is entitled to 100%.

If the reason is retirement,

However, if the reason is to join a cap-

italist firm for better pay, for example, he or she may only receive 80%
(Saive, 1980:233).
Wages
As a subset of the capital account accumulation there is also the
issue of wages.

In Mondragon there formally is no such thing.

pay checks are referred to as "anticipos."

Monthly

This is to be thought of as

an advance on future shares of profits rather than strictly as wages
(Campbell, 1977: 26).
ipo rate,

Neither the surplus capital share nor the antic-

which are calculated by the same "alpha coefficient," are

allowed to exceed a top-to-bottom ratio of three-to-one.

This means pay

and benefit of top management of top management are not to exceed three
times that of the lowest worker.
relative equality.

This is in keeping with the ideals of

Further, the lowest rate is established to be the

average wage of the capitalist firms in the vicinity of the cooperative
(Campbell, 1977: 26).

This is an attempt to keep the cooperatives com-

petive for the workers.

While maintaining this ratio has been diffi-

cult, particularly for doctors, it does provide a certain commitment to
the ideals of the firm, even if this may mean some sacrifice on the part
of managers

In spite of this,

however, there has recently been some

pressure to raise the differential to five to one (Clamp,

1983:

11).

This proposal is thought necessary due to the hiring of top management,
who already have been able to obtain benefits to make the actual ratio
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4.5 to 1.

It is difficult to foresee exactly what effect this will have

on maintaining the ideals of the firms.
Unemployment
Another issue in the economic organization of the firm which must
be addressed is unemployment.

If a worker is laid off, he or she is

entitled to 80% of his or her anticipos;
works funds
(50%).

this is financed by the social

(25%), the reserve fund (25%),

and by the working members

Because of this high cost of unemployment for the

firm, two

solutions are sought. The first is careful planning so as not to hire
too many workers.

As Gutierrez-Johnson states, the need to support laid

off workers "translates into a policy of not accepting any more workers
than necessary, since unwanted unemployment or underemployment of the
members is very costly to the firm" ((1978: 281).

The other solution is

retraining the worker who has become "redundant": "When demand for company products slackens, workers, instead of being laid off, may retain
their pay while studying, thus encouraging worker self-improvement and
also worker commitment to the firm"

(Whyte and Blasi, 1984: 394).

A

further policy to limit the expense of unemployment is the hiring of
persons from other cooperatives who have been laid off.

This

is in

keeping with the increasing associative or federalist character of the
cooperative system in the 1980's.

Unemployment, then,

is an economic

problem which is not ignored, and again the attempt to maintain a sense
of fairness and equality is put forth.

This problem could have been

particularly damaging in the recession of the late 1970' s, but due to
these principles the cooperatives were able not only to maintain membership, but to grow.
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Capital Intensity
A final issue in the economic sphere which needs to be addressed
is the

level of capital-intensity of these

the cooperatives are,
and Logan,

firms.

at best, medium capital

1982: 125).

For the most part,

intensive firms

(Thomas

This may be the highest level of intensity that

these firms may be able to reach given their organizational limitations.
Campbell supports this,

indicating that the form of funding " may rule

out the most capital-intensive methods of manufacturing (1977: 44).

The

issue here is the ability to maintain sufficient capital reserves per
worker versus

the amount of money

needed to enter into

operation in capital intensive industry.

and maintain

This may limit the kinds of

industry that cooperatives may operatie in, as concern is with maximization of labor rather than capital.

Conclusion
The

issues

of

economic organization,

like

social

organization,

attempt in a real setting to implement the ideals of relative equality.
This is operated through the distribution of the surplus to cooperative
members as workers (i.e.

labor), rather than as capital.

The three-to-

one ratio is used to limit the degree of difference from top to bottom.
This

ratio

accounts.

is

utilized

in

both wage

rates

and

capital

accumulation

The money that is paid to these accounts is retained in the

bank, by the firms, in the worker's name so as to be available for working capital and

reinvestment.

The bank,

then,

becomes a

significant

institution because its structure helps maintain the capital needs of
the firm.

I turn now to this and other supporting institutions.
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Au xi I iary Support Institutions
The need for supporting institutions became clear early on in the
Mondragon cooperative venture.

The framework for both the educational

and banking firms were established almost at the very beginning.
types of

supporting cooperatives

are known

These

as secondary

cooperatives

because they include members beyond just their own workers.

As Campbell

states, "The term second degree cooperatives is used to indicate that
the operation is not solely governed by the workforce.
instance,

has two

classes of members,

associated cooperative enterprises)
work for

it)" (1977:

34).

the

and

The bank,

institutional members

individual members

for
(the

(those who

This situation gives these organizations a

slightly different structure and dynamic.

Caja Laboral Popular
As

indicated earlier,

the Caja Laboral Popular

(CLP) was offi-

cially opened in 1960 to meet the capital and managerial needs of the
cooperative

firms.

The

accounts of the workers,

source

of

the

as well as

banks

assets

is

the

capital

the reserve funds of the firms.

This idea of distributing "each member's shares in profits or surplus to
the accounts

members held in the

firm,

rather than paying out these

shares in cash" is traceable back to Arizmendi, and has proven significant in avoiding the "inevitable problem of under-capitalization" (Gutierrez-Johnson and Whyte,

1982: 180).

just provide and save capital;

However, the bank does more than

it also provides new cooperatives

(in

particular) with expert management advice.
In terms of organization, it is set up as are the other organizations with the main difference being the inclusion in the general assem-
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bly of representatives from all the cooperatives in the system.

As in

other cooperatives, the main every-day-type dceisions are made by the
management council.

It differs from other cooperatives in its role as

the center of association of all cooperatives.

The primary tie in this

association is the Contract of Association, to which the bank requires
all cooperative to agree.

This contract not only mandates the organiza-

tion and implementation of principles according to its ideals, but also
stipulates that the bank will have a certain degree of power over the
cooperative (Saive,

1980:

235-236).

This power is manifested in the

management part of the bank (the "empresarial" division), which dictates
the steps that must be followed in establishing a new cooperative, and
which carefully monitors income data once production begins so as to
meet projected

goals.

The bank,

then,

degree of financial power over the firm,
years.

maintains

a

relatively high

especially for the first two

This system is used in part because the bank contributes 60% to

the creation of the firm, and in part because they cannot afford the
overhead which failure would consume; thus, planning is very carefully
undertaken (Eaton, 1979: 33).

The bank is central to the success of the

cooperative system as a whole due its positioning in capital provision
and planning, and it is difficult to see the cooperatives succeeding
without it.
Other Second Degree Cooperatives
In addition to the bank, there are also other secondary cooperative support institutions.

In education, there is a cooperative, Ale-

coop, which provides education at various levels.

It is associated with

a foundry so that students can work to pay fees and expenses for five
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hours per day and then "go to school" for another five hours.
it

is not fully self-supporting as

enterprises and entry fees.

finances

However,

also come through member

It is here that workers come to be trained

and retrained in times of production change or when unemployment occurs.
and they are laid off.

The research and development cooperative works

to provide or find appropriate appropriate production techniques for the
cooperatives.

As Campbell indicates, it seeks "to develop its own tech-

nologies and methods of production suited to their preferred organizational

structure

in

small,

interdependent

cooperatives"

(1977:

35).

The social security cooperative, Lagun-Aro, "provides family allowances,
medical insurance,
benefits,

sickness benefits,

Matrimonial endowments,

and pensions

for

widows,

36).

The

percentage

(Campbell,

1977:

orphans,
of

or

natural

total anticipos

invalid

retirement"
that

this

takes from each worker is quite high, ranging from 20% to 30% (Gutierrez-Johnson, 1978:

273).

Provision of this service is essential to the

workers, as they are not eligible for national social security benefits
because they are classified as self-employed.

When a worker retires,

then, he gets both his capital reserve account and his social seurity
pension.

In combination these form quite a significant amount.

These are the primary second degree cooperaitves.

They provide an

absolutely essential support network for the cooperatives, as the cooperative structure cuts itself off from traditional support systems.
Gutierrez-Johnson and Whyte state,
organizations
Mondragon firsm"

.

As

"The integration of mutual support

has clearly been important to the success of the

(1982:

195).

While the bank is singularly the most

important of these, clearly the importance of the others should not be
over-looked.
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Critique
The system of cooperatives at Mondragon seems to have answered the
needs in the three areas essential for workplace democracy,
stayed true to its ideals.

The organization established to respond to

the two main problems faced by cooperatives,
degeneration,

and it has

under-capitalization and

has been sufficient to meet undreamed of success.

ever, Mondragon is not without its problems.

How-

Jack Eaton (1979) provides

a harsh criticism regarding the division between management and worker.
He argues

that the management council wields too much power,

the social council is impotent to counter its power.

and that

He further argues

that the workers may need to establish a union to assert any amount of
control

in

the

given the common

This

cooperative.

conclusion

assessment of Mondragon as

meeting its ideals.

is

somewhat

surprising

relatively successful

in

Perhaps the most significant response to such crit-

icism is to look at worker satisfaction in the cooperative versus the
capitalist firm.

Bradley and Gelb

(1981) have done this and not sur-

prisingly have found a much higher level of satisfaction with, as well
as

trust

in,

management on the part of cooperative workers.

response is "self-exploitation" (1979:

35).

Eaton's

While Eaton's criticisms

deserve attention, and clearly there is a possibility of a severe split
between management and labor,
out

with

the

bathwater.

The

it would be a mistake to throw the baby
cooperatives

have

shown

an

ability

to

change organizational structure to improve progress toward their ideals
rather than away from them.

Such response has been demonstrated in the

response to the problems of Taylorism and size.

These are issues which

threatened not only the ideals of the firms, but their very existence as
well, and the response, while by no means comlete or finshed have been
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in the interest of labor rather than capital.

Another, problem that the

cooperatives have and will face is bureaucratization.

Again, signifi-

cant steps have been made to limit the effect of this problem by limiting size, increasing associative relations, and finally the system of
monitoring (Thomas and Logan, 1982:
dragon is an "ultimate good";

181).

This does not mean that Mon-

it still has the problems listed above,

even though it is dealing with them.

Its apparent willingness to face

such practical problems from the perspective of an ideal is perhaps the
most attractive feature of the Mondragon system.

Of course, its system

of organization makes it work, but without acknowledging problems, it
would have failed long ago.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
These two examples of worker ownership and control serve as examples of what may or may not be necessary for success.

Various aspects

of each attempt can be compared to see how it is that one is a failure
and the other a

success.

In keeping with the theoretical

framework,

such a comparison will best be understood in terms of social, economic,
and auxiliary institution organization.
In the area of social organization, it is clear that the Mondragon
cooperators were able to maintain the ideals of equality far better than
the Molders.

The cooperators at Mondragon seem to have seen the neces-

sity of institutionalizing their ideals into the organizational structure, whereas the Molders seem to have relied on the honesty and integrity

of

the

workman's

ethic.

The

result

was

that

the

Mondragon

cooperators were able to make changes in their structure as necessary so
as to maintain a relative equality, while the Molders simply fragmented.
Why this happened deserves attention.
ence, or its lack,

One of the reasons of the adher-

to the one member/one vote rule.

It is clear that

the Molders hired outside, non-member workers in direct contradiction to
the

citizenship

ideals.

This

is

contrasted

to

Mondragon

where

all

employees are members, with the possible exception of a small number of
hired executives.

This means that not all the Molders shared the same

rights, and, therefore, not the same access to power within the organization.

This may have been instrumental
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in the Molders'

cooperatives
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degenerating into joint-stock corporations, as those with power already
had a strong sense of being capitalists.
Another reason for the success of Mondragon and the failure of the
Molders in terms of social organization is, ironically, the acceptance
at Mondragon of hierarchical organization, as well as the acceptance of
the skill-knowledge of managers.

Among the Molders, skill-knowledge was

general and a molder had knowledge of and control over the whole production process.

The "integrity" of their labor had not yet been broken

down by mechanization or scientific management.

In spite of this, how-

ever,

among

they were

unable

to maintain

cohesion

themselves,

rejected the role of the manager altogether as unnecessary.

and

This is

contrasted with Mondragon, where the hierarchy was accepted as a kind of
necessary evil so as to compete in the capitalist marketplace, and managers were seen as a part of this process.

Perhaps this shows that a

holistic skill-knowledge is no guarantee of success, just as hierarchy
is no guarantee of failure.

To the Mondragon cooperator's credit, they

realized that relative equality and the limiting of differentials is a
more realistic approach than the imposition of total equality throughout
the workplace.

While these differentials have been a source of strain

for Mondragon, as one would expect given their ideals, these cooperators
were able to change the organization to bring it more in line with these
ideals.
The levels at which the workers have power in the organization.
is another important aspect of social organization.

Again, where the

Molders failed in institutionalizing their ideals, the Mondragon cooperators were successful.

At Mondragon the workers have authority at the

top of the organization by virtue of their membership in the General
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Assembly.

They also have authority from the bottom as workers through

the Social Council.

In this way there is a double accounting to the

interests of labor within the organization.

This is contrasted to the

Molders who seem again to have relied simply upon their workman's ethic.
Thus, the institutionalization of the interests of labor seems essential
to the success of worker ownership and control.
Another feature of the social organization in which the Molders
failed an Mondragon was

successful

is

the establishment of specific

rules and principles of conduct within the organization.

These coopera-

tors have a clear set of guidelines which the members must follow or be
subject to clearly specified disciplinary procedures.

This provides a

certain degree of unity and coherence within the organization.

The

Molders, on the other hand, again seem to have relied less on specified
principles than on their workman's ethic.

This lack of specificity may

have allowed for a variety of interpretations, as well as outright violations.

It is clear, for instance, that the Molder's cooperatives vio-

lated this ethic by producing above what the ethic dictated and by
undercutting the prices of the molders working in capitalist firms.
clarity of social organization principles may, then,

The

be essential to

worker ownership and control as it provides a certain degree of stability and cohesion within the organization.
Based on the examples of the Molders and the Mondragon cooperators
in the area of social organization, what seems most important is the
institutionalization of the ideals of equality.

This includes the one

member/one vote rule for all who work in the firm, the establishment of
the authority of labor from both top and bottom, and the development of
clear and concise principles of organization and action, including dis-

59
ciplinary measures.
at ion will occur.

Without such organization, it appears that degenerThe Molders relied upon the workman's ethic,

and

seemingly the goodness of mankind/labor, which was not sufficient.
This notion of the institutionalization of principles applies also
to economic organization.

One of the biggest problems that worker owned

and controlled firms face is under-capitalization.

As such, the firm

must be organized in such a way as to increase the availibility of working capital.
important.

Here the analysis of how the surlpus is distributed is

Both the Molders and the Mondragon cooperators saw the need

for a reserve working-capital fund, and both split the surplus in similar ways.

In the beginning, at least, the Molders paid out 80% of the

surplus to labor, as interest on labor,

compared to 70% at Mondragon.

The Molders paid out approximately 5% of the surplus to a reserve fund
for working capital, while at Mondragon 15% was paid out for this purpose.

The remaining percentages were paid out differently.

Where the

Mondragon cooperators paid about 15% to a social works fund for the betterment of the community, the Molders paid out its remaining 15% out as
interest on capital based on the number of shares held in the firm.
This was done to increase the likelihood of buying shares in the firms,
making its establishment possible by increasing capital.
In looking at this distribution of the surplus, attention must be
paid to how labor's share is paid-out Mondragon established a system of
individual capital accounts to which labors share is paid, but which is
retained in th bank for each individual worker on the part of the firm.
This can then be used as working capital by the firm, bringing to about
85% of the surplus that the firm has access to in case of need.
trast,

the Molders paid out labors

In con-

share directly to the workers in
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cash, and thus lost the ability to utilize this portion of the surplus.
Given the basic under-capitalization of these firms, it seems essential
to use the capital account approach developed by the Mondragon cooperators.
Another aspect of economic organization that this distribution of
the surplus hints at is the problem of basic ownership.

The fact that

15% of the Molders' surplus is paid out as interest on capital based on
stocks owned points to an important difference between this system of
organization and that at Mondragon.

This basic stock ownership on the

part of the Molders does not exist at Mondragon. At Mondragon there are
no owners per se, rather, there are members who collectively
firm.

"own "

the

Benefits are paid only according to membership and skill level,

never according to ownership.

This difference may have been critical in

allowing for the economic degeneration of the molders' cooperatives into
a joint-stock corporation.

If ownership is based on stocks and not on

general membership the interests and rights of individual ownership may
over ride the egalitarian ideals of such firms.
The differences in the setting of wages must also be noted.

The

Molders utilized their position to undercut prices of capitalist firms,
and thus accept lower wages, so as to gain a greater share of the market
and therefore a greater surplus and profit.

In contrast, the Mondragon

cooperators based wages on the average wage of other capitalist firms in
the area.

The result for the Molders was short-term success but even-

tual failure as the capitalist firms

had the resources available to

match the prices and thus bleed the capital-poor cooperatives dry, hurting both molders

inside and outside the cooperatives.

The Mondragon

cooperators were able to remain competitive in the market-place on rela-
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tively equal terms, and did not base success on their ability to limit
wages and undercut prices.

Worker owned and controlled firms must pay

comparable wages so as to maintain the interests of labor in the long
run, and not rely on the surplus share to attract
not

clear

that

Mondragon

does

so,

it may be

labor.

important

While it is
to

seperate

entirely wages and surplus shares, so that workers have wages as workers
and shares as members.

This would correspond to the authority they have

from both top and bottom in the area of social organization.
A final issue in the area of economic organization is that of capital intensity.

Here it seems that both the Molders and the Mondragon

cooperators were on the right track.
to moderate capital intensity.

Both occurred in industries of low

In fact,

the Molders capital failure in

even a limited capital intensity firm should demonstrate the severity of
this problem.

Without a sufficient amount of capital per worker, based

on the kind of product, these firms cannot succeed.

While they can take

steps to address the problem of limited capital, such as individual capital accounts,
established,

at

it may

be that

these kind

least in the forms

of firms

demonstrated,

simply cannot

be

in certain kinds of

industries.
Closely associated with this problem of economic and social organization is

the support provided by auxiliary institutions,

the bank.

The Molders

failed to

establish any

spite of recognizing their possible necessity.

especially

such institutions

This may simply be due

to the relatively short lifespan of the Molders' cooperatives.

At Mon-

dragon, however, a variety of support institutions were developed.
importantly,

the bank serves

in

Most

as the holder of the individual capital

accounts and capital reserve accounts, and thus is an essential feature
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of the economic success of these firms.

The bank also serves as the hub

of the cooperative network by virtue of its planning division and Contract

of

Association,

which

organization of these firms.

are

essential

in

developing

the

social

Together these second degree cooperatives

provide an environment which is suppportive of the cooperative structure
both

socially

and

economically.

Without

this

support

structure,

it

seems unlikely that such firms ould succedd given the hostility of the
environment on the part of capitalist or socialist institutions.
The three theoretical areas provide a framework for understanding
worker ownership and control.

They demonstrate the importance of set-

ting up and institutionalizing an organization that will implement the
ideals of these firms.

The Molders were unsuccessful in establishing

such an organization in all three areas, while the Mondragon cooperators
were successful in each.

Part of the reason for this difference, apart

from lack of clarity throughout on the part of the Molders, is the situation in which

each was established.

The

Molders'

cooperatives were

established in a time of great crisis, and as such were forced to push
forward as quickly as possible, resulting in poor managerial decisions.
At Mondragon, however, the pace was different.

The cooperative school

was established in 1943, the first foundry, Ulgor, in 1956, and the bank
in 1963.

So, it took twenty years for the essential features to be put

in place.
faced.

This

is

compared to the period of months that the Molders

It may be, then, that attempts at worker ownership and control

should not bite off more than they can chew.

While the Mondragon coop-

erative system has expanded rapidly over the last twenty years, it may
not have been able to do so without the slow, deliberate progress of the
first twenty.

This situation may limit the possibility of using this
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kind of organization as a way for workers to maintain firms closed down
by deindiustrialization.

Without the organization and support struc-

ture, these firms simply cannot succeed.
fix.

This option is not a quick

Concrete organizational problems must be addressed, and steps must

be made to institutionalize against both social and economic degeneration.

To accomplish this, auxiliary institutions are essential.

Fur-

ther, these firms cannot stand pat once the organization is established.
They must be sensitive to change and have the ability to self-criticize.
Reflection must be a basic aspect of these firms, as success is measured
not simply by profit, but by adherence to social and economic ideals.
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